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The Mutual Limitation of Needs as 
Bases of Moral Entitlements: A 
Solution to Braybrooke’s Problem 
DUNCAN MACINTOSH 
Abstract 
David Braybrooke argues that meeting people’s needs ought to be the primary 
goal of social policy. But he then faces the problem of how to deal 
with the fact that our most pressing needs, needs to be kept alive with 
resource-draining medical technology, threaten to exhaust our resources 
for meeting all other needs. I consider several solutions to this problem, 
eventually suggesting that the need to be kept alive is no different in kind 
from needs to fulfill various projects, and that needs may have a structure 
similar to rights, with people’s legitimate needs serving as constraints on 
each other’s entitlements to resources. This affords a set of axioms constraining 
possible needs. Further, if, as Braybrooke thinks, needs are created 
by communities approving projects, so that the means to prosecute 
the projects then come to count as needs, then communities are obliged 
to approve only projects that are co-feasible given the world’s finite resources. 
The result is that it can be legitimate not to funnel resources 
towards endless life-prolongation projects.¤ 
¤My thanks to Heidi Tiedke, Susan Sherwin, and Richmond Campbell for helpful discussion. 
My thanks also to Sherwin and to Peter Schotch for their editorial work on this volume, and, of 
course, to David Braybrooke, for the stimulation of his ideas and for the example of philosophical 
collegiality which he has constituted in the philosophy department at Dalhousie University. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In his book Meeting Needs(1987), David Braybrooke argues that meeting 
people’s needs ought to be the primary goal of social policy. He 
distinguishes two types of needs. First, there are course-of-life needs. 
These are needs which everyone has and which must be satisfied for 
people to function normally in society when performing any of the roles 
of which the society approves and advancing any of the projects it permits 
people to choose. Second, there are adventitious needs, ones varying 
from project to project, and which must be satisfied in order for 
people to advance the specific projects for which they have individual 
preferences. Social policy should be organized to try to satisfy needs in 
their order of importance—course-of-life needs first, adventitious needs 
second. 
In this paper I moot several possible solutions to a problem that worries 
Braybrooke. The problem is that using costly, resource-intensive 
medical technology to meet the basic needs people have to be kept alive 
at what would otherwise be the end of their lives will consume all the 
resources available for meeting needs in general. If grounding entitlements 
in needs is correct, we must find within the concept of needs a 
way to limit this crisis in a morally acceptable way. Many of the solutions 
I shall consider have difficulties, but discussing them will refine 
the problem and point the way to a workable solution. 
4.2 The Appeal of Needs as the Basis of Moral Entitlements 
to Resources 
It is attractive to see needs as the basis of moral entitlements. It seems 
more plausible, for example, to see it as entitling someone to something 
that they need it, rather than just that they want it, or would be made 
happy by it. That they have a right to it might seem an even better argument. 
But what grounds the right? Again, it is plausible to say that 
a person has a right to something in proportion to her need for it. This 
seems more acceptable than saying that her right owes to her having 
found the thing, or her having claimed it, invented it, contracted for it, 
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or having mixed her labour with it. For these latter pretexts presuppose 
principles of justice in the acquisition of goods characteristic of institutions 
of private property, institutions themselves needing grounding; 
and, arguably, they are defensible only if their existence results in people’s 
needs being met. True, such institutions have been defended by 
Nozick as being required in order to afford everyone unfettered liberty 
(Nozick, 1974). But on reflection, surely there are things more important 
than that kind of freedom, specifically, the meeting of people’s basic, 
undeniable needs. There seems, then, to be something foundational 
and irrefutable about someone’s having a title to something on the basis 
of needing it. 
Taking entitlement to ground in needs has the further advantage that 
the question of whether someone has a need seems to be empirical, 
something that can be ascertained by investigation, and on which there 
could be a consensus compelled by the non-moral facts. Thus it would 
make entitlement objective. And this would mean that, in one stroke, 
we had answered three questions of meta-ethics: 
1. Question: how can morality be factual? Answer: the question, 
what, morally, ought to be done, reduces to the question, who 
needs what, and so who should be given what? 
2. Question: how can we infer from statements about what is (true) 
to statements about what ought to be (true)? Answer: by the mediation 
of needs: if it is true that someone needs x, it ought to be 
made true that they are given x. 
3. Question: how can apprehending moral facts be reason-giving in 
the sense of motivating? Answer: our moral duties are to meet 
needs, and seeing that someone needs something tends to incline 
one to procure it for them.1 
Taking needs as the basis of moral entitlements also provides a grounding 
for forming policy on how to distribute resources among people, for 
we could then compute which policies are correct from knowledge of 
1For more on this constellation of issues, see Richmond Campbell’s essay in this volume. 
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people’s needs in a needs calculus, much as was hoped by utilitarians 
for the felicific calculus. 
4.3 Braybrooke’s Problem 
Unfortunately, there are at least two problems for this view, problems 
deriving from the possibility of two kinds of ‘needs monster,’ on analogy 
with the notion of a utility monster. Utilitarians hold that a world 
is morally better the more happiness there is in it. There are at least 
three versions of utilitarianism. On one, what matters morally is how 
much happiness there is in the world, not how many people share in that 
happiness. But on this version, if there were a creature who, by being 
given all of the world’s resources, would be made more happy than the 
sum total of everyone else’s happiness on any other distribution of resources, 
that being should get all the resources; and this seems unjust. 
(This creature is hyper-efficient at converting resources accorded to it 
into its own happiness, and therefore hyper-appetitive for resources.) 
Suppose we say instead that a world is better the more happiness 
there is in it, provided everyone is made equally happy in that world— 
total quantity of happiness is not all that matters; it matters too how the 
happiness is distributed. But then there could be another kind of utility 
monster, a creature so ineffective at converting resources accorded 
to it into its own happiness that, even distributing most of the world’s 
resources to it at our expense, so that the rest of us have only enough 
resources to live lives just barely above being miserable, this creature’s 
life will still just barely be above being miserable. (If the first creature is 
the efficient utility monster, the second is the inefficient utility monster, 
and it too is hyper-appetitive of resources.) 
This suggests a third kind of utilitarianism, one in which both the total 
amount of happiness and its distribution matter, but the distribution 
required is not perfect equality. Instead, if vastly more people could be 
made vastly happier by not trying to make the inefficient utility monster 
happy, then that is how resources should be distributed. Equality matters, 
but only to a degree; it can be outweighed by other considerations 
using some discounting factor. People do not have an absolute right to 
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participate equally in the total amount of happiness, only a weighted 
right. Their being equal participants is only allowed to weigh down to a 
certain degree the total amount of happiness. The degree, of course, is 
problematic to formulate or justify. 
At any rate, until recently, the existence of such monsters was a 
largely abstract problem: most of us are in fact pretty similar in our 
appetites for resources and in our efficiency at converting resources into 
our own happiness. True, relative to me (a non-disabled person), a disabled 
person is in some degree an inefficient utility monster; and relative 
to a disabled person, I am in some degree an efficient utility monster. 
2 But the resource cost to the rest of us for helping the disabled is 
relatively small. For many of the disabled are fairly easily helped, so 
helping them is cheap (we put in wheelchair ramps and so on), while 
the remainder are fantastically hard to help (they have irreparable spinal 
cord damage, say), so hard that there is almost nothing we can do (except 
give them nursing care, say), and so, even doing what we can, it 
is cheap to help. So barring a massive increase in the number of disabled 
people, or in the severity of their disabilities, or in the availability 
of hugely costly means of helping them, redistributions of resources to 
accommodate the disabled will probably not overly drain the total resources 
available. 
But medical technology is getting to the point where, with great cost 
in resources, it is possible to extend individual lives; and the longer lives 
are to be extended, the more resource-costly it is to do the extending. 
Already the lives of some persons are being extended at great cost in 
resources, the cost growing as technologies become available for everincreasing 
prolongation. (Think of the epidemic of diabetes and the 
cost of the dialysis sometimes needed to treat those in diabetes-induced, 
end-stage renal failure—hundreds of thousands of dollars per year per 
patient.) And if ever more resources are devoted to producing these 
technologies in order to extend people’s lives, ever fewer resources will 
2I am assuming for the sake of argument that, on average, it would take more resources to 
provide a disabled person with a given amount of happiness than would be required for a nondisabled 
person; for I am assuming that extra resources would be required to mitigate the effects 
of their disabilities. But in a given actual case, this assumption could be false: notoriously, how 
happy people are can be quite independent of whether or not they have perceived disabilities. 
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be available to support the activities that make people’s lives worth living. 
Pretty soon, we will all be inefficient utility monsters. We will all 
be said to require for our happiness more and more of the ever-moreavailable 
but ever-more-costly technologies needed to prolong our lives. 
The analogous problem for a needs-based morality is obvious, and it 
is a problem Braybrooke admits he is unsure how to solve (Braybrooke 
(1987a) chap. 8): if people need anything, they need the prerequisites 
for being alive; and as our bodies inevitably age, we will all come to a 
point where only longevity-prolonging technology can keep us alive— 
we will all need this technology. But not all of us can have it, or at 
least not without other people, at some point in their lives, not getting 
the resources to have a decent life. Meeting people’s needs for lifesustaining 
technologies can only be met at the cost of not meeting many 
other needs. Perhaps these other needs are less important. And yet they 
are needs which, if they go unmet, make it dubious whether life is much 
worth living. 
On the face of it, Braybrooke’s problem is not solvable. Surely needs 
should be met in the order of their importance; and surely it is more 
important to meet someone else’s need to be kept alive (assuming they 
will have some minimally decent quality of life) than to meet my need to 
have a life more than minimally decent in quality. It then seems morally 
obligatory to distribute resources in such a way that as many people as 
possible are kept alive as long as possible, even if this is to be at the 
expense of the overall quality of people’s lives. 
Indeed, the problem seems even more pressing for needs-based ethics 
than for utilitarianism, or at least the third form of utilitarianism. For 
the utilitarian can say that all extending a person’s life by a day does 
is increase one person’s happiness by one day; and if there is a more 
efficient way to increase more people’s happiness, then since the total 
level of happiness would be higher that way than by using otherwise deployable 
resources in heroic medical efforts for one person, that is how 
they should be used. But it seems that, on needs-based ethics, the need 
a person has to be alive trumps all other non-life-and-death needs of any 
and all other persons. 
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4.4 Possible Solutions to Braybrooke’s Problem 
Braybrooke’s problem in a nutshell is this: given that our social and 
institutional priorities should be meeting people’s needs, in their order 
of priority, how is this not to oblige us to live lives of drudgery supporting 
the longevity of ourselves and others? There seem to me to be 
several possible solutions. I now consider them in order of increasing 
conceptual ambitiousness. 
4.4.1 Questioning the Empirical Assumptions of the Problem 
One solution is to claim that the problem makes empirically false assumptions. 
Maybe it will not prove all that expensive to extend lives; 
maybe this can be done without much sacrifice in the meeting of other 
needs, and in the meeting of the needs of other people who do not yet 
require medical technology to live. For one thing, extended lives may 
wind up being extended in productivity as well, so that, as the need for 
life-extension technology expands, so will those resources constituted 
of a robust workforce. And so we will have resources to meet these 
needs: people with longer lives will be able to work to pay for everlonger 
lives. 
It may also be possible to innovate not just in inventing life-sustaining 
technologies, but also in their resource cost—maybe they are likely to 
become cheaper and more efficient, especially as they are pursued in an 
ever-expanding market. 
Further, maybe meeting some people’s prolongation needs will result 
in others’ needs being met—the person whose life we save can now 
continue in the workforce; and with her productivity there, she can contribute 
not only to maintaining her own life, but to meeting the needs 
of other people, and to meeting needs of other sorts than those of life 
prolongation. This solution, however, banks on empirical hopefulness 
and so cannot be counted upon. 
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4.4.2 The Defeasibility of Needs 
Another proposal recognizes that the needs of a given person or population 
may be defeasible and may have to yield to the more pressing 
needs of other persons or populations, so much so that those whose socalled 
needs are defeased never really had them. To take an example, 
all women might have been thought to need to be tested for the gene 
for breast cancer. But in fact, unless there is a specific pattern of breast 
cancer in one’s family, it is unlikely that one has the gene. So the people 
with breast cancer in their families need the test more than people 
who do not; and if the test requires resources that are also in demand for 
many other, more pressing needs, maybe the people who do not have 
this known risk factor do not really need the test at all.3 
There are attractions to the proposal: it seems right to meet more 
pressing needs first and to expend resources where they will do the most 
good. However the proposal presupposes that we have some general 
principle for balancing out the distribution of resources to people, and 
this has not yet been deduced from the concept of needs as bases of 
moral entitlement. Besides, there is no guarantee that, even giving resources 
first to those who need them most, there will not come a time 
when resources will be exhausted even by this principle. After all, everyone’s 
life comes to an end if it is not extended by medical technology, 
and no one’s need to live a longer life is, other things equal, more 
pressing than anybody else’s. We will all eventually need costly heroic 
medical technology. We will all still become inefficient needs monsters. 
4.4.3 Is the Location of Needs in Individuals or Groups? 
A related solution is to reconceive the locus of needs. It is generally 
assumed that the thing which has needs is the individual person. But 
perhaps needs are had not by individuals in isolation, but by populations; 
or perhaps individuals do have needs, but only derivatively from 
the needs of the populations of which they are members. Either way, 
3This is an aspect of Susan Sherwin’s proposal which is presented in her essay in this volume. 
In addition to owing this and the next proposal to her paper, I am grateful for its succinct and lucid 
summary of Braybrooke’s book and of what I am calling Braybrooke’s problem. 
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and returning to the problem of what to do about an aging person who 
requires costly medical technology to remain alive, our first question 
therefore should not be what this older person needs, but what older 
people need. The answer to this is perhaps whatever will keep as many 
of this population’s members alive for as long as possible with as good 
a quality of life as possible. And to that end, perhaps, what this population 
needs is not heroic, resource-costly new medical technology, but 
better nutrition, community-based, preventive medicine, better education, 
and a higher minimum income. We could do much more for the 
population of older people with low-tech preventive medicine and social 
reorganization than with the limited number of high-tech machines 
we could produce.4 
Notice that, by taking populations rather than individual persons as 
the bearers of needs, we benefit conceptually by being able to consider 
what makes a population as a whole well off in terms of needs satisfaction; 
this notion seems already to embed some of the conceptual 
apparatus we require in order to do needs balancing: the mere fact that 
a given member of a group is faring poorly does not automatically mean 
that the group is faring poorly and so may not mean that there has been 
a failing of moral duty in looking after that population’s welfare. This 
could allow us to justify not meeting what would have been the pressing 
needs of an individual on an individualist analysis of needs. 
Unfortunately, it is not obvious that groups matter except so far as 
their members matter individually, so that the needs of the group may 
ultimately be nothing but the sum of the needs of its members; and if 
we think of the parts of this sum as constituted of one individual at a 
time, we are back to each of these people needing heroic technology, 
their need for it obliging us to drain away resources from meeting other 
sorts of needs of theirs and of other people. 
We might reply by saying that the very identity of the members as 
individuals derives relationally from the identity of the group, so that 
it makes no sense to see any of the members as individuals except in 
relation to the group. Or at least it makes no sense to see them as having 
4This proposal is probably a conceptual generalization of a specific proposal Sherwin makes. 
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needs except derivatively from the needs of the group.5 Thus your need 
for aid in having your life extended merely gives you title to what a 
policy that advances the longevity of older people in general would give 
you. So you are specifically entitled only to what, on average (to take 
one example of a criterion for assessing the state of a population), best 
serves older people. And since having expensive technology for you 
would mean not having community-based medicine for the many others 
who could benefit by it compared with your having your technology, 
you do not have a need for that technology, but only for the services of, 
say, community-based medicine. 
Problems remain, however, for we can still face conflicts of needs 
between groups—the quality-of-life needs of young people versus the 
life-and-death needs of old people, for example. We might try to evade 
that by treating everyone as members of one giant group, therapizing the 
needs of the population as a whole rather than individual by individual, 
and giving to each individual only the form of treatment which benefits 
the most members of the population as a whole. 
But while no doubt we are all in some sense defined relationally to 
everyone else, we also have sub-relations in which inhere some needs; 
and these, again, can conflict with the needs inhering in other subrelations, 
or even in ourselves as between the several sub-relations in 
which we participate. (For example, I am now relatively young but will 
one day be old.) Moreover, the larger we make the population in the 
group, the more the problem of what to do for its members becomes our 
original problem; for the more inclusive we make the group, the more 
heterogeneous we make its membership, and so the more potential for 
conflict of needs defined in sub-relations there is among its members. 
If the group contains the young and the old, for instance, it seems more 
likely that there will be a conflict of needs between the group’s members. 
While if we say that what each member is entitled to is determined 
by the needs of the group, then this presupposes that we have figured out 
how justly to balance the distribution of resources to people generally. 
Thus in reconceiving the locus of needs onto groups and away from 
5Again, I am indebted to Sherwin for her work on relational conceptions of persons; there is 
a close connection between what I am considering here and aspects of her proposal. 
4.4. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO BRAYBROOKE’S PROBLEM 87 
individuals, I have perhaps illicitly assumed that, once needs are located 
as inhering in groups, the notion of needs would permit helping as many 
people as possible, and helping them as much as possible; and this may 
be problematic for allowing us to ignore someone whose inclusion in 
our policy would reduce the total number of people we could help, or 
the degree to which we could help them. For how is this to be justified? 
After all, they too are members of the population. So why are we 
allowed to ignore them? The answer is presumably that we have not ignored 
them—they are getting the same treatment as everyone else (community 
medicine, say)—it is just that it is not really doing them much 
good. But then it seems we should have a way of deducing from the 
concept of needs itself, not just that needs inhere in populations rather 
than individuals, but also the correctness of using a certain conception 
of what it is for a population’s needs to be adequately met. For why 
should not the test be, say, that the least well-off person in the group 
is made better off by the correct policy, rather than that most people in 
the group are made better off? But if the former is the correct test, we 
have our problem back, for the least well-off people will again become 
inefficient needs monsters relative to us. While if the latter is the correct 
test, we are efficient needs monsters relative to them. 
Finally, even waiving this conceptual issue, and even if we can go a 
long way towards meeting the needs of a group conceived at the group 
level with low-tech manoeuvres, ones low in resource cost, sooner or 
later, the only way to go further will be with expensive technology and 
research, and we will have our problem back; we will once again all be 
inefficient needs monsters. 
4.4.4 Do People Really Need Indefinitely Long Lives? 
Another way to solve Braybrooke’s problem might be to challenge directly 
the idea that the mere fact that something would be a means to 
extending a person’s life means she needs that thing; for it is disputable 
whether a person needs to live a very, very long life. Suppose there 
were a way to keep a rabbit alive indefinitely: does the rabbit really 
need to live forever, especially if the means involves virtually starving 
all the other rabbits? Now suppose we can do this for a person. Does 
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she really need to live indefinitely? Why? Perhaps it would be nice 
for her—she might like it or want it, and so might her friends, family, 
colleagues. But that it would make her and various other people happy 
does not entail that she needs it. No doubt there are various projects her 
being alive would allow her to prosecute. But does she need to complete 
indefinitely many projects? Is there any need that she be the one to do 
all of them? 
This line of argument may not work, however, for our conception 
of what someone needs to have had a full, satisfactory life is probably 
something whose boundaries gradually expand as the possibility of a 
longer life expands. Perhaps when life spans were shorter it would have 
been thought extravagant to have a life much more than seventy years, 
and it would have been doubted whether anyone needed to live much 
longer—a seventy-year span would have been long enough to find love, 
raise a family, have a career or two, be a decent citizen, experiment 
with alternative lifestyles, see what there was to see of the world, cultivate 
one’s potentials and talents, make some mistakes and atone for 
them. What need to live much longer? But now that people can live 
to be eighty, ninety, a hundred, there seems to be all that much more 
to experience and do—there is now the prospect of a long, healthy, and 
peaceful retirement, extended grandparenting, travel, new hobbies, extended 
education, seniors’ political activism. Our conception of what it 
is to have lived as long as one needed to live for a good and full life has 
expanded, and will keep expanding. And why should it not?6 
4.4.5 Needs to Life Extension Not Really More Pressing Than 
So-Called Less Basic Needs 
But maybe we are wrong to think of the means to life prolongation 
as representing greater or more pressing or higher-priority needs than 
those that would have to go unmet to meet them. Why, after all, does 
6I should acknowledge that Braybrooke was more interested in the problem of the resource 
needs of those experiencing medical difficulties in mid-life, a time when, by any measure, they 
had not yet lived a full life; but the logic of the problem is the same for older people, especially 
as our conception of a reasonably full and long life expands. Indeed, the logic is starker for older 
people, since aging and its infirmities are inevitable and so ubiquitous. 
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a given person need to live another day? Answer: in order to do the 
things persons trying to live a good life do in a given day—go to a 
movie, maybe. But a given younger person not on death’s door without 
expensive technology to rescue her might need to go to the movie too. 
Looked at perhaps a bit cynically, a life is nothing but a string of days 
full of miscellaneous projects, and so the need to live, and the need 
for the means of continuing to live, is nothing but a need to advance 
projects. But we all have projects, no one’s automatically more valuable 
or pressing than anyone else’s. So why should the fact that a given 
person requires a lot of resource-costly medical technology to engage in 
her next project mean that its requirements should have higher priority 
than, say, mine, which need nothing but a movie ticket? That you will 
die without the machinery sounds like a big, trumping argument, but all 
you are going to do with your technology is, say, go to a movie. So now 
we are comparing your going to a movie, figuratively speaking, with my 
going; and why should you win? Why should I renounce my ticket to 
finance your machine just so you can go to the movie instead of me? 
4.4.6 Meeting Basic Needs versus Meeting the Needs the Meeting 
of Which Make LifeWorth Living 
Relatedly, if you are not even going to go to the movie—maybe no one 
can afford movies after we all pay for your machine—why stay alive at 
all? What is the point if you cannot, say, go to movies? It is implausible 
that we should have to trade off what makes life worth living just to 
make more life, whether the trade-off is within one person’s life, or 
between the lives of two. 
4.4.7 Meeting Other People’s Needs as Not Really Being a Cost to 
the Meeting of Our Own Needs Given That We Are Needs 
Altruists 
Yet another way we might go is to observe that people’s needs overlap in 
this sense: if it is true that one person’s seeing that another person needs 
something inclines the first person to ensure that the second has her need 
met (as was hypothesized of needs as part of what makes needs-based 
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grounding of entitlements attractive), then perhaps the first person has 
a need to see the second person’s need met. But if one of our needs is 
to see other people’s needs met, so that meeting their needs is part of 
meeting ours, then funnelling resources to them is not seen by us as a 
resource cost to us and the meeting of our needs. Returning to utilitarianism, 
relative to me, a disabled person is not an inefficient utility 
monster if I derive happiness from the happiness of the disabled; for 
then I would not experience the funnelling of resources to the disabled 
as a cost to my resources. And relative to a disabled person, I am not 
an efficient utility monster if she derives happiness from the happiness 
of the non-disabled, for then she would not experience the funnelling of 
resources to them as costs to her resources. 
This can only take us so far, however. For at some point, my needs 
being defined as needing the meeting of your needs must ground out in 
a need defined independently of other people’s needs. And in any case, 
it is certainly false from the start that our only needs are for meeting 
others’ needs. But if we have any other needs, and if meeting them could 
require an indefinitely long life, it will be possible for life-prolongation 
needs to swamp all other needs. 
4.4.8 Needs as Relative to Projects Approved by Communities; 
Re-Choosing Needs 
Braybrooke himself in effect provides the materials for a more promising 
solution. He sees needs as functions of the extension of the term 
‘needs’ in a linguistic community. This extension is determined by the 
projects which the community endorses as permissible or important, 
with the most basic needs being things that are means to the pursuit of 
virtually any project. But then it might be an option to have a community 
alter its conception of appropriate projects, thence to alter what 
will count as needs; and perhaps one factor in any such self-chosen 
cultural evolution would be the co-tenability of its projects given finite 
resources. A community might choose, then, to have the project of living 
a very long life not be among the projects it recognizes as important. 
To be sure, there are issues this proposal raises: 
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1. It implies that communities choose their cultures reflectively and 
deliberately; and while this may be true to a degree, much of a 
culture’s evolution occurs without such self-direction. 
2. Even if communities choose their cultures—choose the projects 
they find acceptable as options for people within the culture— 
it seems intelligible to imagine a community making a mistake 
about whether a project should be permitted. But then, in making 
decisions to put accepted projects into equilibrium with available 
resources, it is presumably possible for a community unjustly to 
limit or permit projects. And if the genuineness of a need in turn 
depends on the correctness of cultural decisions about whether 
to embrace or eschew projects, it follows that there are cultureindependent 
standards on something’s being a need. In that case, 
however, it is not—or not just—the community approving or not 
approving certain projects that means people do or do not need the 
means to them, but these independent standards. So it is the standards 
which are doing the work; and so for us to use this solution, 
we must figure out what the standards are. 
But let us waive this worry for a moment; let us suppose then that 
a community cannot make a mistake: someone needs x just if the 
community has approved her project and x is instrumental to her 
prosecuting it. Then there is another problem: 
3. Needs then seem less empirical, and more stipulative, and so less 
suitable to answering the meta-ethical questions the answers to 
which I advertised as among the attractions of seeing moral entitlements 
to ground in needs. At the very least, needs would be 
empirical only in that it is empirical which stipulations a community 
has made. 
Another difficulty with this approach is: 
4. It solves the problem by an illegitimate kind of fiat: if we find 
that our community has tacitly embraced the project of people 
having indefinitely long lives, and if we find that this is draining 
away resources from every other project, we just decide no 
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longer to embrace that project. But this seems no different from 
simply refusing to meet people’s extant needs. It is too easy a way 
out, not to say an immoral way. At the least, surely principles of 
procedural justice are violated. People are entitled to know what 
the rules are and not to have the prospects of their presumptively 
community-approved projects yanked out from under them. We 
could get around some of this by giving notice that, from now on, 
no new beginnings of projects of a certain sort will be approved; 
but there would still be all those people who have well begun the 
project of extending their lives, people who will continue to drain 
all the resources. A final difficulty with the proposal is: 
5. If there are constraints of procedural justice on its implementation, 
then unless these can be analysed from the concept of needs, 
again, it is not needs that are grounding entitlements, but something 
else, or needs plus something else. 
4.4.9 The Conceptual Analysis of Needs; the Axiomatics of Needs 
I do not have room to deal with all of the difficulties with the previous 
proposal. But I see a way to begin rehabilitating it if we combine 
it with some conceptual analysis of the notion of needs. The problem 
has turned out to be that of how to resolve conflicts of needs, the conflict 
between basic and less basic needs, and between the basic needs of 
some persons and the less basic needs of others. It is obvious from the 
medical technology problem that there is no purely practical solution 
to the conflict: if living a long time is an acceptable project, then the 
basic needs of people seem expandable indefinitely as life-prolongation 
technology improves. The only hope of a permanent solution, then, is 
conceptual. And the form of conceptual solution I shall suggest is that 
the logic of needs is more like that of rights: just as your rights and mine 
stand as mutual limits on each other, so my needs and yours mutually 
limit each other. This could work in either of two ways: it may be that it 
cannot be true that you have a certain need if some need of mine would 
have to go unmet in order to meet yours. Or it may be that, while we can 
have needs in conflict, the status of one’s needs as serving as a basis for 
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one’s moral entitlement to resources is limited by the status of the needs 
of others as serving as a basis for their moral entitlement to resources. 
Along these lines, we can articulate, by conceptual analysis, some axioms 
from the idea that needs are the basis of resource entitlements. All 
other things equal, surely 
a It is better that the needs of more people are met than less. 
b It is better that the needs of a given person are met well rather than 
poorly. 
c No one’s needs have automatic title to be met if the cost is that no 
one else’s needs would be met. 
d A person has title to have her most pressing needs met even if this 
is at the cost of other people having their less pressing needs fully 
met, provided their needs are still met fairly well. 
e If two people equally need something, and there are resources to 
give it to only one, a morality of needs is silent on who should get 
it—something else must break the tie. 
f If a certain distribution of resources would meet all of everyone’s 
needs, it is the morally correct distribution (and if more than one 
distribution would do this, any of them can count as correct, though 
perhaps depending on the implementation of an appropriate symmetrybreaking 
technique and the official community acceptance of the 
chosen distribution). 
g If, compared with any other arrangement (and failing the possibility 
in (f)), meeting a given person’s needs more fully than the 
needs of all others are met would result in more people’s needs 
being met, and in these needs being met more fully, then this is a 
correct arrangement (again, with a clause to handle tied systems of 
doing this, where the other systems do it by privileging a different 
person). 
h No person is such that, independently of other considerations, 
their needs deserve to be met rather than those of some other person. 
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i No person is such that, independently of other considerations, 
their needs deserve to be met more fully than those of some other 
person.7 
These axioms afford a solution to our problem, at least if I am right 
that the need to live another day is no more pressing than the needs 
of a person not immediately at risk of dying. For then the need to live 
another day is just the need to do whatever one was going to do that day; 
and both of these people have that need. But since this means that these 
two people have needs tied for being basic and pressing, then, by axiom 
(e), needs ethics has nothing to say about which of the two should have 
their need met. We may use a symmetry-breaking technique. Political 
negotiation might be part of the process of breaking the tie, perhaps the 
sort of negotiation we see during elections about how much priority to 
assign health care in the national budget and in the process of interest 
groups lobbying policymakers. (Axiom (e), then, goes a long way to 
deriving procedural justice from the notion of needs as entitlements.) 
Furthermore, if needs are to base moral entitlements to resources, if 
resources are finite, and if needs come into existence by communities 
approving potential projects, and approving the choosing of them by 
certain individuals, then perhaps something is only a legitimate project 
if its foreseeable resource requirements are not incompatible with those 
that will result from other people in the community making their approved 
choices among approved projects. For recall axiom (f), that a 
resource distribution is correct if it meets all of everyone’s needs. There 
appear to be two ways to bring about such a distribution: we can find 
the resources to meet all needs; or, considering the situation ab initio, 
as if prior to any needs existing, we can be careful to create only needs 
that the totality of available resources can meet. 
Let me develop this second strategy: suppose that, by approving 
projects and their selection by individuals, we in effect allow to come 
into existence needs not all of which can be met given finite resources; 
then we have brought into existence an unjust pairing of needs and re- 
7Probably more axioms could be given than these; these ones could be given a more hierarchical 
structure, and they could be more perspicuously shown to follow from the notion of needs 
as entitlements. Projects for another time. 
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sources compared with a possible arrangement in which all people’s 
needs could all be fully met given available resources. So projects must 
be co-feasible given resources, and people can be allowed to choose 
among those projects only in ways co-feasible given the permitted choices 
of others. 
This is something we already take care to ensure in our culture. We 
restrict the number of people who can be members of certain professions, 
or who can be funded artists; sometimes we require or allow people 
to compete for the privilege of having a certain project, in part to 
make sure that people having it is not an excessive drain on resources 
needed for other people’s projects—think of grant and scholarship competitions. 
All of this is consistent with the axiomatics of needs. And 
it solves our problem, provided, again, that life-prolongation needs are 
just project needs (or provided that living a long life is a separate project 
able to be approved or not independently of certain other projects); for 
then life-prolongation needs are limited in their permissible extent by 
the co-feasibility constraint. That is, if life-prolongation needs are, 
project-wise, no more pressing than those associated with any other 
project, then they may be permissibly limited.8 
This would be consistent with the possibility I mooted earlier of 
its being intelligible for a community to make a mistake in approving 
projects, and so in allowing supposed needs to come into existence by 
these approvals. For, arguably, no community has successfully created 
genuine needs if its so-called needs violate the needs axioms. In particular, 
no community has successfully created genuine needs if its so-called 
needs violate the constraint (axiom (f)) that needs, and so projects and 
the numbers of people allowed to participate in certain projects, must 
8It might be objected that, while we can avoid failing to meet people’s needs by failing to 
approve projects, or by failing to approve individual people’s choosing certain projects, thus preventing 
the needs from coming into existence, we may also be harming people by doing this; for 
we are in effect limiting various opportunities of people. The reply is that we are doing this justly, 
and that allowing these opportunities, because it would result in reductions in the social capacity 
to meet needs, extant or potential, would itself be unjust; and if Braybrooke is right that meeting 
people’s basic needs is the first moral priority in entitlement considerations, then failing to meet 
needs would be worse than not allowing opportunities. Finally, arguably we are not being unjust in 
restricting opportunities provided we follow procedural justice in distributing them—for example, 
provided we break ties in unbiased ways. 
96 CHAPTER 4. DUNCAN MACINTOSH 
be co-tenable given finite resources. We can then say that people who 
plead that they have a need, where their having the so-called need met 
would involve a total drain on resources, never really had that need in 
the first place, because the project that is costing all of these resources 
was never correctly approvable. 
This meets the concern of another point raised above that it is wrong 
to refuse to meet people’s extant needs just because they have become 
huge resource drains. For the needs in question are now revealed never 
to have been legitimate, since they violate the needs axioms. But what 
about the procedural justice issue, people having a right not to have 
their projects cancelled without notice? Again, axiom(e) to the rescue: 
the projects of those who are having resources drained away by 
the longevity project of others also have such rights; it is sad that the 
resource drain was not anticipated, but we now have a tie on claims; 
and this can be resolved, again, by political negotiation and symmetrybreaking. 
Note that all of this solves the problem as I formulated it earlier in 
terms of needs monsters. For this solution makes both kinds of monster 
impossible, since both drain all resources in ways we now see are 
incompatible with the axioms that conceptually define needs as bases 
of moral entitlements: no one can be allowed projects whose existence 
would create needs which would consume all the resources required to 
meet other people’s needs, on pain of violating axioms (f), (h), and (i). 
Still, there are troubles. For one thing, this solution relies on the 
claim that something’s being a means to your not dying does not make 
it something for which you have an especially pressing need. But if that 
you will die without x does not constitute your having a pressing need 
for x, what on earth does? Surely there is something special about needs 
for things required in order for one to go on living. Well, perhaps what 
is special about continuing to live is that the end of life is not just the 
failure to advance a project, but the end of all possibility of projects. On 
the other hand, if life-prolongation needs consume all resources, that 
constitutes, in its own way, the end of all possible projects too for those 
denied resources by their deployment on life-prolongation needs. So 
maybe there is nothing special about life-prolongation needs after all. 
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Again, we have a mere tie, one we may resolve by axiom (e). 
Another objection might be this: are there not biologically given, 
unrenounceable needs, ones not just in common to all actual culturally 
approved projects, but to all possible ones so far as we are biologically 
based, resource-dependent beings? This a plausible worry. But it in 
effect introduces a different conception of what a need is from the one 
Braybrooke gave us. His account implies that, given biology and the 
decisions society makes about how to deal with it, needs are, at least 
in part, constructed by the community approval of projects and their 
community-approved adoption by individuals; and so needs are, therefore, 
hugely plastic. 
It confirms Braybrooke’s conception over the conception of needs as 
biologically given, that many people have had projects whose prosecution 
required renouncing the so-called biologically given needs—think 
of kamikaze warriors eager to sacrifice their lives in what they see as 
a just cause, or athletes who knowingly compromise their longevity by 
using ultimately toxic but performance-enhancing drugs in the project 
of athletic excellence. Staying alive is not part of every project; so the 
need to stay alive is not universal, and so not biologically given either. 
True, many possible projects require one’s being alive for one’s prosecuting 
of them. But that does not automatically make staying alive a 
universal, biologically determined, inevitable need; it only makes it a 
means to certain ends—ends at least in some degree, for some people, 
optional. 
There may be a way to accommodate the nerve of this objection 
more fully in Braybrooke’s conception of needs, however. For it may be 
that most people, perhaps for biological reasons, value certain things— 
for example, a long and healthy life—and this would induce people 
to endorse these things as projects, and so these projects would be 
found as part of virtually every culture. Nevertheless, the needs axioms 
still provide both the conceptual framework of needs and a constraint 
on morally permissible community endorsements of projects— 
there is still the requirement of the co-tenability of needs given finite 
resources. While resources should be matched to needs, needs should 
also be matched to resources. 
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The co-tenability constraint no doubt leaves a lot of latitude; probably 
there are many ways to meet it, and so many different kinds of 
communities’ approved projects could pass it. But it is also a real constraint. 
And it may be that, given this, certain projects may be legitimately 
community-endorsed only by the consent of all needs claimants 
in the community. Imagine, for example, a community that has become 
obsessed with astronomy: by consensus vote, it approves the project 
of devoting most of its resources to producing an extremely long-lived 
astronomer; the hope is that she can be kept alive long enough, with 
extraordinary medical and technological efforts, to witness the remaining 
history of the universe, even unto its eventual heat-death billions of 
years from now. This would be a case where a co-tenable collection of 
needs has been created: the astronomer needs to live indefinitely to witness 
the end of the universe; and all others in the culture are like worker 
bees who need to do their part in making sure the astronomer lives to see 
the end. (Offspring are raised to have the same projects.) But had the 
community not come to a consensus on this enterprise, the astronomer 
would have been an inefficient needs monster relative to some people in 
the community, and her needs would not have had automatic title to be 
met. 
There are further complications here, however. For one thing, it 
now seems that needs are not the ultimate foundation for entitlements. 
Rather, preferences ground everything; for it is preferences that induce 
members of communities to approve of possible projects, and to approve 
individuals choosing projects. So the need for something, x, can come 
to exist only if people in communities come to a consensus on projects 
and the having of them by selected persons, projects to whose prosecution 
x is then a means. And this must make us ask whether, apart 
from the constraints of the axioms of needs, there are constraints on 
morally permissible preferences, and therefore projects, and therefore 
needs. It must also make us wonder how it is to be determined what 
a community is; who is in it; whether communities are obliged to be 
such that the projects one community approves are co-tenable, given the 
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world’s finite resources, with the projects other communities approve;9 
and whether it is permissible to attain consensus in a community by the 
exile of dissidents. 
There is no room to deal with these matters here, beyond observing 
that, while needs may require preferences in order to come to exist, 
preferences cannot make just anything a need. For possible needs 
are constrained by the axioms of needs; and if it is needs that create 
moral entitlements, then at the very least, not just any preferences can 
accrue moral entitlements to be satisfied. Given the range of possible 
preferences, a range which has, since Hume, been thought to embed all 
manner of prima facie distasteful, and yet supposedly ultimately uncriticizeable, 
preferences—from the purely self-interested to the positively 
malevolent—this limiting of moral entitlements by the required mediation 
of needs must be seen as moral progress. For it means that mere 
preferring does not make right.10 
9These questions figure in another problem which worries Braybrooke: as part of the internationalization 
of culture, we in the developed countries have begun to see those in the undeveloped 
countries as members of our linguistic community, so that the extension of our use of the term 
‘needs’ now includes their needs. But then we are obliged to provide resources for meeting their 
needs, again, possibly at the expense of making everyone’s life just barely above miserable in 
terms of met needs. 
10This may afford a start on a solution to yet another worry of Braybrooke’s, namely, that some 
needs are prima facie immoral, or at least morally embarrassing; but yet as needs, surely they have 
title to be met, possibly in competition with prima facie moral needs. How can we justify meeting 
the latter over the former from the concept of needs? Well, the needs axioms, particularly the 
co-feasibility constraint, may so constrain genuine needs as to rule out the immoral ones. This 
connects with work I have done trying to prove that all of people’s possible preferences must 
be such as to be co-tenable in the sense of being co-advanceable, this ruling out preferences to 
exploit other people in the sense of arranging the non-satisfaction of their preferences as a means 
to the satisfaction of one’s own. Note that this would require all beings with preferences to see all 
other such beings as in the same community, and this would help answer some of the questions of 
the preceding paragraph in the main text. Similar sorts of moves could be used to rule out for a 
morality of needs, various extreme, selfish conceptions of ethics, e.g., needs egoism. For more on 
the required co-tenability of preferences, see (MacIntosh, 1998). 
